

# The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Assessing Cooperation and Coordination with the UN

Lorenzo Fioramonti, Maxi Schoeman and Gerrit Olivier

Series editors:

John Peterson, University of Edinburgh ([john@peterberg.org](mailto:john@peterberg.org))

Gunilla Herolf, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ([herolf@sipri.org](mailto:herolf@sipri.org))

Theresa Höghammar, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ([hoghammar@sipri.org](mailto:hoghammar@sipri.org))

Nadia Klein, University of Cologne ([nadia.klein@uni-koeln.de](mailto:nadia.klein@uni-koeln.de))

Funda Tekin, University of Cologne ([funda.tekin@uni-koeln.de](mailto:funda.tekin@uni-koeln.de))

Wolfgang Wessels, University of Cologne ([wessels@uni-koeln.de](mailto:wessels@uni-koeln.de))



# **The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Assessing Cooperation and Coordination with the UN**

## **Abstract**

Multilateralism sits high on the European foreign policy agenda and constitutes a founding principle of the EU's integration process. Yet, a comparative analysis of key missions and diplomatic initiatives in the field of crisis management reveals lights and shadows in the much-heralded 'choice of multilateralism' underpinning the cooperation between the EU and the UN. On the one hand, the EU strives to support the UN and operate legitimately within its framework and mandate; on the other hand, it wishes to carve out an autonomous space for its role in multilateral crisis management, be it through military means or through diplomatic strategies. Moreover, institutional cooperation at the top-level has not always resulted in good coordination on the ground, thus undermining 'effective multilateralism'.

Lorenzo Fioramonti  
Email [lorenzo.fioramonti@gmail.com](mailto:lorenzo.fioramonti@gmail.com)

Maxi Schoeman  
Email [Maxi.Schoeman@up.ac.za](mailto:Maxi.Schoeman@up.ac.za)

Gerrit Olivier  
Email [gerrit.olivier@up.ac.za](mailto:gerrit.olivier@up.ac.za)

<http://www.mercury-fp7.net/>

## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	3
The EU in Crisis Management: Interventions and Policies .....	5
The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Top-Level Cooperation and Operational Coordination with the UN .....	10
The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Coordination among Member States and with Other Relevant Actors .....	17
Conclusion.....	21
Bibliography.....	23

# The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Assessing Cooperation and Coordination with the UN<sup>1</sup>

## ***Introduction***

Multilateralism sits high on the European foreign policy agenda and also constitutes a founding principle of the European Union's integration process. According to the 2003 Commission's communication *The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism*, international cooperation is "a precondition for meeting numerous global challenges" and "the EU has a clear interest in supporting the continuous evolution and improvement of the tools of global governance" (Commission of the European Union 2003). In the field of peace and security, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are united by the premise that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international security rests with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in accordance with the United Nations Charter. It is precisely within this framework that the EU professes its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the UN in crisis management.

Since 2003, when the entry into force of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provided the EU with a long-awaited military structure and rapid reaction force, "the question of the EU's possible contribution to UN-mandated peacekeeping and peace-making operations" has become "more urgent than ever" (Commission of the European Union 2003). As both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP are underpinned by the wish to uphold the founding principles of multilateralism, providing active and early support to UN-mandated or UN-led operations has become "a clear track for the progressive framing and deployment of the EU's security and defence policy and capabilities" (Commission of the European Union 2003). According to the communication,

Conflict prevention and crisis management lie at the intersection of the international community's development and security agendas. The European Union and the UN should coordinate systematically with regional organisations in conflict prevention and in crisis and post-crisis situations, and complement each other's resources where possible. They are also areas in which the goals and activities of the European Union and UN are united by the premise that the

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper is the result of a comparative analysis of a set of contributions by researchers involved in both the Mercury project and the research consortium *EU-GRASP: The EU as a Global and Regional Actor in Security and Peace*, both funded by the European Union under the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme (2009-2012). We acknowledge the contribution of Carin Berg (University of Goteborg), Emmanuel Fanta (UNU-CRIS), Hubertus Juergentliemk (University of Cambridge), Nicole Koenig (University of Edinburgh), Nona Mikhelidze (IAI), Marco Pinfari (London School of Economics), Ruth Santini (Forum on the Problems of Peace and War), Michael Schulz (University of Goteborg) and Fred Soderbaum (University of Goteborg)

case for multilateralism and international cooperation is unequivocal (Commission of the European Union 2003).

The year 2003 marked a fundamental turning point in the definition of an overarching strategy of cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management. The perceived success of Operation Artemis, the first out-of-area ESDP mission deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo in close cooperation with the UN, prompted significant enthusiasm among EU policy makers and contributed to the publication of another important document outlining the breadth and depth of multilateral cooperation, the *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management*. Besides reiterating the EU's commitment to a strong operational partnership with the UN, the declaration also calls for the adoption of practical steps to enhance coordination between the UN and the EU and "establishes a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility", particularly in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practice exchanges (EU and UN 2003). One of the tracks identified in the Joint Declaration under the heading 'planning' aimed at defining the modalities under which the EU could provide military capabilities in support of the UN, besides a series of complementary protocols on civilian aspects of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. The same year, this commitment was strengthened by the release of the European Security Strategy (ESS), which declared that "strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority" (EU 2003: 9).

Since 2003, cooperation with the UN has become a key component of the EU's approach to crisis management. By and large, EU missions have been designed within the framework of UN goals and objectives, besides being authorized by specific UNSC resolutions. Brussels and New York have also improved their channels of communication. At the same time, this close cooperation at the headquarters level has not always resulted in effective coordination at the level of operations. As the EU itself recognizes, "[t]here is often a serious gap between targets adopted at global level and their implementation on the ground. In seeking to fill the 'implementation deficit', the EU needs to address the capacities of its partners in the developing world in particular to meet their international commitments, and to explore the possibilities for a more consistent focus on assistance linked to specific global targets and commitments" (Commission of the European Union 2003).

This paper provides a comparative analysis of EU-UN multilateral crisis management in a selected number of case studies. It looks at both the top-level cooperation between Brussels and New York and the quality of actual coordination on the ground, including the role of other key actors such as individual EU Member States and regional organizations (such as the African Union, the Arab League, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Given that EU-

UN multilateral crisis management has been quite pronounced in the fields of civilian and military operations in the Balkans and in Africa, this paper will focus more specifically on these regions, while also providing insights from other conflict zones, especially the Middle East. Specific reference will be made to crises in the Great Lakes region, Kosovo, Darfur-Sudan, the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, Libya and Afghanistan.

From a theoretical point of view, the analysis applies the conceptual framework developed by the international research project *MERCURY: The EU and Multilateralism in the Contemporary Global Order*, which defines multilateralism as

three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalised international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states (Bouchard and Peterson 2011: 10).

Specifically, the paper will adopt the useful distinction between ‘institutionalised’, ‘crystallising’ and ‘aspirant’ multilateralism (Peterson et al. 2008: 9). The first type describes rules-based cooperation established by formal mechanisms (often within a specific international institution). The second type describes forms of cooperation that are in the process of being formalized, while the third type identifies forms of multilateral cooperation that occur in the absence of any formally-codified rules (Peterson et al. 2008).

The next section describes the breadth and depth of EU interventions in the field of crisis management, focusing in particular on some examples from the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East. The central section then looks at the quality of cooperation between New York and Brussels in terms of overall approaches, policies and complementarity, while highlighting gaps and shortcomings in the actual coordination on the ground (operational level). Then the paper discusses the involvement of EU Member States vis-à-vis other key players and provides some concluding remarks.

### ***The EU in Crisis Management: Interventions and Policies***

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been particularly traumatic for the European continent, especially due to the EU’s inability to intervene in the region during the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. At that time, the EU did not possess a clear institutional capacity to guarantee security in its neighbourhood. Its foreign policy infrastructure was very much in its infancy and only allowed for joint declarations of principles and common positions among the Member States. When the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) attacked the Milosevic government in Serbia in order to

put an end to the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo, a number of European countries participated in the military campaign by providing personnel, funds, military bases and other types of support under the leadership of the US. This event further demonstrated the need for an autonomous policy framework capable of equipping the EU with a coherent and actionable capacity to conduct military and civilian missions of peacekeeping, peace-making and conflict management. In 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was finally established, although it only became operational in 2003, when the first EU missions were deployed.

Ever since, the EU has played a central role in Eastern Europe and Africa, where a number of ESDP campaigns have been conducted. In the case of Kosovo, the EU has been the leading peacekeeping actor, especially since it took over responsibilities from the UN in late 2008. Not only does the EU currently account for the largest civilian and financial contribution to the country, but it also offers – with the prospect of membership – the only viable way forward for a gradual rapprochement between Kosovo and Serbia. At the same time, only 17 Member States have diplomatic representations in the country and five Member States do not recognize Kosovo's independence altogether, which generates significant problems for the implementation of policies on the ground.<sup>2</sup> Kosovo can be seen as a test for EU foreign policy and European institutions have deployed all political, economic and diplomatic instruments available to pacify and consolidate the country. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is the biggest civilian operation the EU has ever launched. It provides support in the field of policing, judicial processes and customs management. In 2005, the then EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, aptly summarized the EU's strategic thinking: "More than any other region in the world, this is a European responsibility. Simply put, we cannot afford to fail". Since 2007 Kosovo has also received financial aid under the instrument for pre-accession assistance, which further shows the commitment of the EU to deal with Kosovo as a priority matter, thereby making full use of all its instruments and facilities, including enlargement-related mechanisms.

Also in Africa, the EU has been particularly active in the field of conflict management and peacekeeping. If in Kosovo the EU has carried out its largest civilian mission to date, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the EU has been active for many years, since launching the first out-of-area ESDP mission in 2003. Due to the scale and timing of the various interventions, the DRC can be seen as a laboratory for crisis management and peacekeeping in areas where the EU cannot obviously offer the 'carrot' of enlargement.

---

<sup>2</sup> Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain do not recognize Kosovo's independence.

Besides a significant amount of ongoing financial aid to the country, the EU has deployed five civil and military missions in the DRC since 2003: Operation Artemis (which was the first out-of-area ESDP military mission in 2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (civilian mission from 2005 to 2007), EUFOR RD Congo (military mission in 2006), EUSEC RD Congo (ongoing civilian mission since 2005) and EUPOL RD Congo (ongoing civilian mission since 2007).

Another important EU mission in Africa was deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic as a response to the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur/Sudan. The EUFOR was officially established through the Council Joint Action of 15 October 2007 and aimed at improving the situation in the neighbouring areas of Darfur by addressing and focusing on issues related to human rights and human security.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the setting up of this mission was also justified by the inability of the EU to become more involved on the ground in Sudan, given this country's unwillingness to accept the presence of 'westerners' in its troubled province. Besides this direct military mission, the EU also financed the operations conducted by the African Union (AU), through its two military missions in Sudan (AMIS I and AMIS II) (Boshoff 2005). Moreover, the EU adopted a Joint Action to provide additional technical expertise and resources to the African mission, including airlift, logistic support and training.<sup>4</sup> In addition, a certain number of European military as well as civilian police experts were deployed with the AU missions in order to facilitate operations on the ground. The total assistance provided by the EU and its Member States to AMIS is estimated to have totalled more than 500 million EUR.<sup>5</sup> After AMIS was replaced by a hybrid AU-UN mission known as the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the EU continued supporting these peacekeeping campaigns through the provision of funds and expertise via the UN command.

More recently, the EU and its Member States have been active in two other conflict zones in Eastern Europe (precisely in the Caucasus) and in Africa (precisely in the Maghreb). In the first case, the EU played an important role in reaching a ceasefire between Georgia and Russia during the 2008 conflict. Its role was strengthened by Russia's outright rejection of a US involvement, which qualified the EU and its Member States for a preferential access to the parties involved. Although this conflict management process began within the framework of bilateral EU-Russia talks, in the aftermath of the war, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe called for the establishment of a mediation forum to be based in Geneva in order to coordinate security and stability policies in the South Caucasus. This initiative was based on the "Six-Point Ceasefire Plan" reached by French (then EU)

---

<sup>3</sup> Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action on the European military operation in the republic of Chad and the Central African Republic*, 2007/677/CFSP, Luxembourg, 15 October 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action*, 2005/557/CFSP, 18 July 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Council of the European Union, *Factsheet: EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS*, AMIS II/08, Brussels, January 2008.



President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, which brought to the end the military confrontation between Moscow and Tbilisi. Beyond the Geneva forum, the EU has continued to influence the peace process by indirect means. In 2009, it launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which is largely viewed as an indirect means of conflict resolution. The EaP emphasizes “the need for their earliest peaceful settlement on the basis of principles and norms of international law”.<sup>6</sup> The concrete activities that it promotes however are centred on the promotion of good governance and financial assistance as well as regional trade and energy cooperation.

In the Maghreb, during the 2011 Arab Spring, the EU relied mainly on soft diplomacy, issuing a series of declarations of principles, inviting governments to respect human rights and international conventions, and demanding accelerated political reforms in the wake of the popular unrests. While in Tunisia and Egypt, the relative speed with which the regimes collapsed did not require a more direct action, in the case of Libya, the EU opted for a more direct involvement, besides the leading role played by some Member States in the NATO-enforced no-fly zone. A few weeks after the beginning of the crisis in February 2011, the European Council firmly condemned violence, urging former Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi to step down and recognizing the Transitional National Council (TNC) as “a political interlocutor”.<sup>7</sup> In May, the High Representative opened an office in the rebel stronghold Benghazi to provide support in the fields of border management, security reform, the economy, health, education, and in building civil society. A wide range of negative measures was also applied: arms embargo and targeted sanctions against Gaddafi and persons related to the regime<sup>8</sup>; an asset freeze against 26 Libyan energy firms and six port authorities.<sup>9</sup> Throughout the crisis, the EU has also been the biggest humanitarian aid donor in the country, with almost 150 million EUR provided in the first three months, including a civil protection mechanism that led to the evacuation of around 5,800 Europeans and 31,522 third country nationals.<sup>10</sup> The Council of the EU also adopted the legal framework for a military/humanitarian operation (EUFOR Libya), to be launched at the request of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in order to “contribute to the safe movement and

---

<sup>6</sup> Council of the European Union, *Joint Declarations of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit*, Prague and Brussels, 7 May, 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 78).

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.eu2011.hu/files/bveu/documents/st00007\\_en11.pdf](http://www.eu2011.hu/files/bveu/documents/st00007_en11.pdf) (accessed on 31 October 2011).

<sup>8</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:058:0053:0062:EN:PDF> (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>9</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122446.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122446.pdf) (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>10</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya\\_factsheet.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_factsheet.pdf) (accessed 31 October 2011).

evacuation of displaced persons and support humanitarian agencies in their activities in the region.”<sup>11</sup>

While the EU has been able to take the lead in Eastern Europe (both Balkans and, to a lesser degree, in the Caucasus) and in Africa, its role as a conflict manager and a peacekeeper in the Middle East has been rather marginal and often intentionally sidelined by other international players, particularly the US and Israel. Generally speaking, the EU has rarely used any hardcore security measures in order to influence, change or prevent escalations in the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Mostly, it has limited itself to declarations and some forms of diplomatic pressure during particular crises, such as the breakout of the so-called *al-Aqsa intifada* in 2000, the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations and the Gaza War in 2008. As regards its overall strategic engagement in the Middle East peace process, the EU has intentionally aimed at achieving a long-term impact as opposed to short-term results. Since the early 1980s, the then European Economic Community had already committed itself to a two-state solution, a point that was further affirmed by the European Council meeting in Berlin in 1999. Throughout the years the EU has developed political and economic relations with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, various association agreements and action plans within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as constant dialogue with the various parties involved, including the other members of the so-called Quartet (US, Russia and the UN) and the Arab League. Moreover, the EU has supported cooperation programmes in the field of technology, trade and research as well as a number of civil society initiatives (e.g. the so-called people-to-people projects).<sup>12</sup> On the ground, the EU has deployed two civilian missions to support the Palestinian Authority. The EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), headquartered in Ramallah, aimed at improving Palestinian civil police and law enforcement capacity. The EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (Gaza Strip) was designed to strengthen the management of the Rafah crossing border, a critical communication point with Egypt.

The role of the EU as a conflict manager and peacekeeper is also less prominent in Afghanistan, where security tasks are largely performed by NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and by the US directly through Operation Enduring Freedom. Generally speaking, the EU is in a much less prominent position if compared to its missions in the Balkans, as its different assistance projects blend into a wider (and very complex) landscape, involving a variety of donors and external actors. Although the EU is active in a

---

<sup>11</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:089:0017:0020:en:PDF> (accessed 31 October 2011)

<sup>12</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/practical/practical\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/practical/practical_en.htm) (accessed 31 October 2011).

number of fields, one major initiative stands out: EUPOL Afghanistan, a CSDP mission designed to train the Afghan National Police (ANP) in terms of accountability and respect of human rights.

### ***The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Top-Level Cooperation and Operational Coordination with the UN***

As discussed in the introduction, the EU places great emphasis on its support for multilateralism, which – in the context of conflict management – is generally translated as a form of more or less institutionalized cooperation with the UN, emphasising the key role of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. In all of the ESDP missions launched so far, the EU has operated within the strategic framework provided by the UN (Gowan 2009: 117), although this has in a few cases been done informally, without any specific UN mandate.

Besides the Commission's communication on "the choice of multilateralism" and the joint declaration on EU-UN cooperation discussed in the introduction, in 2004, the European Council addressed the issue of how to implement its commitments to multilateral crisis management in a declaration on *EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations*, which identifies two main options for cooperation:

1. Provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, whereby the decision to provide military capabilities to a UN operation is a national responsibility.
2. A full EU operation adopted in response to a request from the UN. This implies the launching and conduct of a EU operation in support of the UN and under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. Different modalities could be envisaged. The EU could conduct operations under a UN mandate, either as a standalone operation or take responsibility for a specific component within the structure of a UN mission (Council of the European Union 2004).

The declaration also touches upon two types of rapid response operations: the 'bridging' model and the 'standby' model. The bridging model aims at providing the UN with time to mount a new operation or to reorganize an existing one. Such a model calls for rapid deployment of appropriate military capabilities, a clear duration of the mission and a commonly agreed end-state. The standby model would consist of an "over the horizon reserve" or an "extraction force" provided by the EU in support of a UN operation (EU 2004: 5). Such a type of operation calls for immediate reaction and is therefore very demanding. Moreover, it would involve complex coordination between the EU and the UN, and is limited in its usability.

In June 2007, a joint statement outlined some of the key components of this form of multilateral cooperation between the EU and the UN. These include “regular senior-level political dialogue between the UN Secretariat and the EU Troika on broader aspects of crisis management”; systematic “exchange of views between senior UN Secretariat officials and the Political and Security Committee of the EU”; continued “meetings of the UN-EU Steering Committee” (including ad hoc meetings in crisis situations); cooperation on aspects of “multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform”; exchanges “between UN and EU Situation Centres”; and, finally, “cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre” (Council of the European Union 2007: 2).

In spite of the density of these institutionalized forms of cooperation and the prominence given to the UN as initiator, the reality is often the opposite: it is the EU to set the agenda and to shape this cooperation taking into consideration not only what the UN would need (or what it demands) but mainly what the EU is willing to give (Tardy 2005, Major 2008).

Among the most successful cases of close cooperation between the EU and the UN, we find Kosovo and the DRC: two contexts in which the EU-UN cooperation took the form of ‘institutional multilateralism’, being clearly legitimized by UN institutional procedures. In the case of Kosovo, for instance, the EU has been strongly involved in the various attempts to build consensus on the status of the province within the UN and, since 2008, it oversees the implementation of the plan proposed by the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Initially it was expected that the Ahtisaari plan would be formally approved in a UN Security Council resolution that would supersede Security Council Resolution 1244 (International Crisis Group 2008: 3), but Russia and China vetoed any agreement that would violate Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo. In this political stalemate, the EU was ready to accept responsibility and the Troika group (consisting of Russia, the US and the EU) undertook the final attempt to find an acceptable agreement for Kosovo’s future from August to December 2007 (United Nations Security Council 2007). A compromise was found in June 2008 shifting the responsibilities of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to political reporting and giving the EU the responsibility of supervising the process of Kosovo’s stabilization and autonomy. The EU explicitly committed itself to employing a regional approach, providing substantial investment in terms of finance, people and security and using the ‘carrot’ of a prospective membership of the EU for both Serbia and Kosovo as a way forward to press for reform and reconciliation (Solana 2005). Before the EU was put in charge, its Member States along with the US were leading the political and security agenda towards the Balkans. The UK, France, Germany and Italy provided strategic guidance in the

1999 NATO campaign and since then as they have been part of the Contact Group, which also included Russia (Sperling and Webber 2009).

Operation Artemis, deployed in the DRC in the summer of 2003, is a paradigmatic example of direct EU contribution to UN operations. Artemis was indeed the first bridging model mission to stabilize the political and human rights situation in east DRC prior to the establishment of a more long-term UN peacekeeping initiative. It was indeed the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to ask for the deployment of a well-equipped Interim Emergency Multi-national Force (IEMF). Through the intermediation of France, the request was brought to both the UN Security Council (which authorized it with Resolution 1484) and then to the European Council, which launched it through Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP. The mandate of Operation Artemis was to work in close coordination with the Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the existing UN-led operation in the country.

The EUFOR mission in the DRC is another example of close cooperation between the EU and the UN. In December 2005, the UN requested the EU to back up MONUC with a new military deployment during the first election process in the country since the assassination of former rebel leader and President Laurent Kabila. The EU Council responded positively and in early 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1671, providing the EU with a specific mandate under Chapter VII. The mandate clearly defined time, scope as well as the responsibilities of the EU operation, stating that EUFOR could act only following explicit requests from MONUC. According to some analysts, this logic can be interpreted as a form of 'burden sharing' to guarantee the autonomy and independence of the UN as a security actor while "strengthening its weak image" (Scheuermann 2010: 21). In spite of this successful formal cooperation, it must be noted that at the logistical level it took about six months for the EU to launch the operation. Such a delay was mainly due to conflicting commitments among Member States, given that France refused to take the lead in manning and coordinating the mission (having already taken the lead on Artemis) and Germany, which eventually led the initiative, had to overcome its traditional reluctance to get involved in war zones. Besides Operation Artemis and EUFOR, the EU also launched two civilian missions in DRC since 2005. EUPOL Kinshasa (renamed EUPOL DR Congo in 2007) aimed at providing advice to the Integrated Police Unit in DRC. Although it was not directly connected to any specific UN request, it built on the UNSC Resolution 1493 calling for the implementation of an integrated Congolese police unit (Morsut 2009). A second civilian mission, EUSEC, focused on training the Congolese National Army and was authorized in response to a request of the DRC government. Although indirectly, it was framed within Resolution 1565 and Resolution 1592,

which called for international efforts to support the Congolese authorities in reforming the security sector (Morsut 2009).

Good coordination at the macro-level, be it more political, diplomatic or military, does not necessarily imply effective coordination on the ground. Yet, it is precisely the micro-level of daily tasks that often makes the difference between effective and ineffective multilateralism in crisis management (Morsut 2009). In this regard, the multilateral track record of the EU is less encouraging than it may appear from the analysis of macro-level coordination with the UN.

In Kosovo, for instance, while the relationship between the UN and the EU has been good and productive at headquarters level, differing political interests and approaches have had a very negative impact on cooperation and coordination at the field level. The handover from UNMIK to EULEX was rather problematic due to serious delays: while the Ahtisaari plan had called for an EU takeover in 2006, the actual handover only happened in 2008-2009. Moreover, the UN still holds the formal authority and UNMIK keeps about 400 staff in the country, with inevitable duplications. The 2008 unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo further complicated matters, given that the EU is generally viewed by Serbs as favouring Kosovar interests, while the UN is regarded as more neutral (22 out of 27 EU Member States recognized Kosovo's independence, as opposed to 81 out of 192 Member States of the UN). In the field of policing, it has been argued that while the "EU intended to deploy a light police presence", the UN "persuaded the planners to propose a larger force" (Gowan 2009: 123). Furthermore, it must be noted that both the EU and the UN operate in the area through a ramification of different institutions and agencies. In the case of the EU, operations have been coordinated by the Council, while the Commission has been in charge of most funding streams. Whether the European External Action Service will simplify these and other institutional overlaps and redundancies is still to be seen given the fact that most policies still fall under the coordination of the DG Enlargement. At the UN level, besides UNMIK, the Kosovo Team comprises the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN-HABITAT, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Volunteers programme, the UN Population Fund, UN Women, the UN Office for Project Services and the International Labour Organization (ILO), while additional roles are also played by the International Monetary Fund, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the World Bank.<sup>13</sup> Amid these various layers of institutional overlaps,

---

<sup>13</sup> *About UNMIK: Mandate and Structure*, United Nations, <http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/about.aspx> (accessed 31 October 2011).

the security situation in Kosovo remains quite problematic as demonstrated by the attacks orchestrated by Serbian nationalists in July 2011, after Kosovo's government approved a ban on imports from Serbia.

Although Operation Artemis in the DRC was by far one of the most successful cases of EU-UN institutional cooperation in conflict management, there were nevertheless significant coordination hurdles at the local level. In the pre-deployment phase, the UN complained about the lack of information coming from the EU, particularly for the deployment of IEMF, "which could have caused incidents when the EU force and UN peacekeepers were simultaneously deployed" (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, October 2004 cited in Tardy 2005: 56). Moreover, at the outset of the military operations, structured communication between Artemis and MONUC was basically non-existing. For instance, "MONUC was surprised by the arrival of the first Artemis troops at Bunia airport" (Scheuermann 2010: 14). Managing communication on three different levels (at the headquarters in New York and Brussels as well as on the ground) turned out to be more complicated than expected, given that "the UN and the EU did not institutionalize their field coordination through an exchange of liaison officers" (Scheuermann 2010: 14). EUFOR took stock of the lessons-learned during Artemis and largely improved communication flows. Nonetheless, the complexity of common procedures and different levels of responsibility in the chain of command caused glitches in the coordination between the EU and the UN on the ground (Major 2008). The MONUC command was composed of two levels: New York and Kinshasa-MONUC Force Headquarters. The UN Force Commander in the DRC had total control over his troops and reported directly to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. On the other hand, the EUFOR was organised around three centres: Brussels, where the EU Political and Security Council was based; Potsdam in Germany, where the EU Operational Headquarters were located (under German leadership); and Kinshasa, where the EU had based its Force Headquarters (Major 2008: 28). Due to coordination problems, in an assessment of its actual impact on the ground, the EUFOR mission has been described as a cosmetic operation "limited, brief, risk-averse and ultimately ineffective" (Haine and Giegerich 2006). When the UN asked the EUFOR to stay longer than its end-date due to legitimate security concerns, the EU responded negatively. The then German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Jung, made a lapidary comment: "We kept our word: our soldiers are going to be at home with their families by Christmas" (Scheuermann 2010: 24).

At the same time, the EU civilian missions in the country (EUPOL and EUSEC) enjoyed a higher degree of coordination with the UN than both Artemis and EUFOR. This is noteworthy given that the former did not follow any specific UN resolution and can therefore not be conceived as forms of institutionalised multilateral cooperation. Their coordination was more spontaneous and driven fundamentally by local actors. Looking at these two examples, some observers have argued that the EU “seems focused on a pragmatic rather than an institutionalized approach in its cooperation with the UN”, especially in the context of civilian interposition operations (Morsut 2009: 10). Through decentralised organisational structures and distinct geographical focus areas, the two sides achieved bottom-up complementarity rather than top-down institutional cooperation: while the European operation focused on training the Integrated Congolese Police Unit in the capital city, MONUC worked for a countrywide reform of the Congolese National Police (Morsut 2009).

The Darfur crisis in Sudan and the recent uprising in Libya can be considered two examples of overall top-level cooperation leading to some type of ‘external support’ provided by the EU to UN operations without any institutionalized form of on-the-ground coordination. When in 2005 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1591 allowing for the imposition of targeted sanctions against the Sudanese government, the EU followed suit by ratifying a package of restrictive measures against rebel groups and security forces.<sup>14</sup> The EU also applauded the decision by the UNSC (Resolution 1593) to call for an investigation of the International Criminal Court into the crimes against humanity perpetrated in Darfur and called on the Sudanese government to collaborate with the Court.<sup>15</sup> The EU’s decision to deploy a military mission in Chad and the Central African Republic also reflected the frustration with the incapacity of the AU-led missions (AMIS I and II) to secure the region.<sup>16</sup> This is why the EU favoured the transfer of peacekeeping operations to the UN, which ultimately led to the establishment of a hybrid AU-UN mission in Sudan. Similarly, in the recent military campaign in Libya, the EU Member states with permanent and non-permanent seats in the UNSC played an active role in pushing forward the multilateral agenda. Moreover, the EU Commission, being the most important humanitarian aid donor, was directly involved in coordination efforts under the umbrella of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Responding to the pressure of France and Italy, the EU also provided the legal basis for EUFOR Libya,

---

<sup>14</sup> Common Position concerning restrictive measures against Sudan and repealing Common Position 2004/31/CFSP, 2005/411/CFSP, Brussels, 30 May 2005

<sup>15</sup> 2719th Council Meeting, External Relations, SUDAN - Council conclusions, Brussels, 20 March 2006, 7035/06 (Presse 69); 2744th Council Meeting, External Relations, SUDAN/DARFUR - Council conclusions, Brussels, 17/18 July 2006, 11575/06 (Presse 219); 2748th/2749th Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, SUDAN/DARFUR - Council conclusions, Brussels, 15 September 2006, 12255/06 (Presse 241).

<sup>16</sup> Council Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, 2007/677/CFSP, Luxembourg, 15 October 2007



an operation designed to reinforce UN humanitarian efforts. Yet, due to the OCHA's scepticism regarding the potential conflict between military and humanitarian approaches, this mission was never launched.

In various other cases, EU-UN cooperation has taken place more at the political and diplomatic level, rather than on operational grounds. In some cases, a certain degree of 'institutionalization' within the framework of UN procedures characterized the type of multilateral cooperation sponsored by the EU, while in other cases crisis management was administered through forms of 'crystallizing' or 'aspirant' multilateralism. The 2006 Lebanon war, a 33-day long conflict between Israel and the paramilitary forces of Hezbollah, is a case in point of institutional multilateralism at the political and diplomatic level. During and after the crisis the EU was heavily involved in both multilateral and bilateral conflict resolution activities. At a multilateral level, individual European countries and representatives of the EU Commission contributed to the elaboration of common policies vis-à-vis the conflict during various international meetings, while five EU Member States were also members of the UN Security Council (France, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia) and played a central role in the negotiations that led to UNSCR 1701. According to a recent analysis of EU official declarations and documents issued during and after the crisis, there was an overall endorsement of UN initiatives aimed at restoring peace in Lebanon (Pinfari 2011). From an operational perspective, though, this support did not translate in any direct EU initiative but mainly in some Member States taking the lead in the implementation of UNSCR 1701, including the pledge of providing 7,000 blue helmets for the UNIFIL II mission in the country (Pirozzi 2006: 3). By contrast, the type of multilateral crisis management adopted in the 2008 Georgian crisis would be better described as 'aspirant', given the flexible participation of key actors, which included the EU, the OSCE, the UN and the US, as well as the conflict parties: Georgia and Russia. Although the multilateral cooperation among these stakeholders was formalized within the so-called Geneva forum, this latter remains an ad-hoc platform aiming at short-term crisis management rather than conflict settlement and resolution (Whitman and Wolf 2010).

An example of crystallizing EU-UN multilateral cooperation is provided by the Middle East Quartet, established in 2002, which also includes the US and Russia. Its goal was to create a multilateral framework for an Israeli-Palestinian negotiated solution (based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338) and, more concretely, it aimed to support the establishment of a two-state agreement, with Israel and Palestine living side by side within secure and recognized borders. At a more political level, the establishment of the Quartet tried to instil new momentum in the "moribund peace process" by complementing American mediation

with the support of three critical players: the EU, the UN and Russia (Tocci 2011). An upgraded role of the EU (hitherto confined to the mere role of 'payer' rather than 'player') was welcomed particularly by the Palestinian leadership, which viewed it as a potential counterbalance to the pro-Israel bias in American foreign policy (Yorke 1999). The involvement of the UN conferred to the Quartet international legitimacy, adding weight to a peace process aimed at respecting at least three UNSC resolutions (i.e., 242, 338 and 1397) (Prendergast 2006). Moreover, the UN's involvement was welcomed by the Arab world and the developing world more broadly.

Political and diplomatic cooperation between New York and Brussels has been rather close, also on key matters pertaining to the potential resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this regard, the EU has agreed on five final status issues, namely borders (in accordance with UNSC Resolutions), settlements (viewed as illegal according to international law), Jerusalem (not stating the status of the city), refugees (supporting a just, viable and agreed solution to the issue) and security (condemning all sorts of violence and urging the Israeli government to act according to international law).<sup>17</sup> Yet, significant differences have emerged in various occasions, especially during the Gaza War of 2008-2009. At that time, neither the EU Council nor the Member States urged Israel to refrain from violent actions and find peaceful ways to counter security threats, although Israel's behaviour was publicly denounced by the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Hafner-Burton 2008). After the end of the Gaza war, the UN commissioned Judge Richard Goldstone to draft a Report on the responsibilities of the two sides before and during the war. The Report controversially concluded that war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity had been committed, by Israel and Hamas, both of which were found responsible of indiscriminate attacks against civilians. At the UNCHR, 25 countries voted in favour of endorsing the Report (no European country among them), five voted against it (the US, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine), 11 abstained and France and the UK, among others, refused to vote.

### ***The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: Coordination among Member States and with Other Relevant Actors***

Since the EU is a supranational composite of 27 states, each of which maintains certain key prerogatives in the field of foreign and security policy, it is fundamental to also assess the potential complementarities or tensions arising from the fact that in most crisis situations the

---

<sup>17</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/eu-positions/eu\\_positions\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm) (accessed 31 October 2011).

cooperation between the UN and the EU is affected by the actions (or lack thereof) of other players. Therefore, in this section, we analyze and assess the type of cooperation/coordination between the EU, its Member States and other relevant global or regional actors.

In the case of crisis management in the DRC, for instance, one aspect adding to the EU's inability to effectively coordinate its operations with the UN is to be found in the lack of coordination among its Member States, especially those pursuing their own national agendas in Africa. As already mentioned, the idea of launching Operation Artemis began via bilateral talks between the UN Secretary General and France, which immediately declared its willingness to lead a EU military force. According to interviews we conducted in the region, the multilateral framework is often exploited by certain Member States to legitimize their own bilateral interests in African countries. As remarked by a state diplomat speaking on the condition of anonymity, "this type of EU-UN multilateralism is very convenient for France."<sup>18</sup> One reason for this is that "the EU provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories) with a means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influence in Africa." Thus, by acting as implementers of European foreign policy, former colonial powers "could claim more credit for their dual national/European roles in troubled areas in the African Great Lakes Region" (Lurweg 2011: 117). The coordination with other African countries and African regional organisations was also wanting, with the only exceptions of South Africa and Angola, which cooperated with EUPOL in the selection and training of the new Congolese security forces.

In the case of Kosovo, NATO and the OSCE have been very important actors, alongside groupings of states such as the Quint (France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US), the Contact Group and the International Steering Group. Although UNSC Resolution 1244 gave the strategic framework for all these organizations, different mandates and day-to-day coordination have proven challenging at times. The overlapping responsibilities and the often high-turnaround of leadership has increased complex cooperation formulae, often preventing quick, decisive and collective decision-making. For example, the most recent EU Special Representative was appointed from 6 May to 31 July 2011 and was at the same time International Civilian Representative. When he left to take the post of Director for Western Balkans and Turkey in the European External Action Service on 4 August 2011, his position remained vacant. In the Middle East, the setting up of the Quartet obviously strengthened the capacity of the EU to cooperate not only with the UN, but also with the US and Russia. Moreover, the Quartet explicitly lent its political backing to the Saudi peace initiative – later

---

<sup>18</sup> Interview with an EU Member State representative in Kigali, Rwanda, 13 October 2010.

endorsed by the Arab League and now known as the Arab Peace Initiative – which foresaw a full normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab world alongside a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, including, not only Israel-Palestine, but also Syria and Lebanon.

Afghanistan, instead, is an interesting case of prevalent bilateral approaches by some key Member States, especially in the field of security, where the EU is carrying out a policing mission (EUPOL Afghanistan). Since its creation in 2007, EUPOL has faced numerous challenges related, amongst others, to slow reaction mechanisms, heavy bureaucratic procedures and a crowded donor field. Thus, EUPOL spent roughly one year finding its feet, and tried a wide number of reforms simultaneously. Moreover, at least initially, countries such as the UK, engaged in the dangerous southern areas and faced with situations of intense combat, favoured the deployment of a robust police force that could even be used to sustain counter-insurgency efforts. Others, such as Germany, involved in the relatively stable North, instead endorsed a vision of policing that promotes basic public order and does not engage in any form of combat. This issue seem to have been resolved, but much time has been lost and EUPOL's overall strategic impact four years into its mission is still questionable. Moreover, with 321 international civilians and police officers (as of October 2011), EUPOL is still far from the 400 personnel authorized by the Council.

In Libya, the EU was involved in a number of multilateral initiatives involving various regional organizations. Together with its Member States, the UN, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the EU has been a member of the Libya Contact Group established at the London Conference on 29 March 2011? The EU is also part of the so-called "Cairo Group", another multilateral forum bringing together the UN, the AU, the Arab League and the OIC. Before the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, the Group endorsed a more 'political' approach to the pacification of Libya and the transition to a democratic government. Throughout the crisis, there were contacts between NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton as well as cooperation at staff level, between the various military committees and between the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee.<sup>19</sup> Yet, there was no EU-NATO cooperation in the planning processes surrounding EUFOR Libya.<sup>20</sup> Although Libya was high up on the agenda of both the EU and the AU, there has been limited cooperation due to differing political goals. The AU rejected the use of force and strongly favoured a political solution. When EU and NATO members were already urging Gaddafi to step down, AU leaders pushed for the international

---

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-003943&language=EN> (accessed 31 October 2011)

<sup>20</sup> Interview with senior NATO official, 9 June 2011.

community to embark on a multilateral process involving both rebel leaders and Gaddafi. Though the AU joined its Western partners in calls for regime change in early June,<sup>21</sup> African leaders continued to reject UN-sponsored measures such as the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, arguing that it would “seriously complicate” efforts to find a peaceful solution in Libya.<sup>22</sup> The support of the Arab League was an important pre-condition for the EU's engagement and a reference point for its legitimacy. From the beginning of the crisis, Ashton liaised with Amr Moussa, then Head of the Arab League. In numerous statements and remarks, EU representatives underlined the important role of the Arab League and of the “Arab partners”. In a joint statement following the adoption of UNSCR 1973 (17 March), Ashton and van Rompuy declared that the Arab League’s cooperation “is essential and their role is clearly recognised by the Resolution.”<sup>23</sup> When confronted with the question of whether the EU as a whole should recognize the National Transitional Council, the EU High Representative maintained that the decision would be dependent on the Arab League:

My view is that we should decide our position as the 27 in conjunction with the Arab League and the importance of them giving us a lead from the Arab world on what's happened. [...] If the Arab League said that this was the group of people that they thought would be the appropriate interlocutors that would help us to do decide what to do next... I do think the Arab League have a role to play in this for sure.<sup>24</sup>

In the declaration of the extraordinary European Council on 11 March, the EU stated that its Member States would examine all “necessary options, provided that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region.”<sup>25</sup> However, repeated criticisms by the Arab League regarding the implementation of the no-fly zone were received with concern and magnified intra-European divisions, especially after the rift created between France and Germany by the latter’s decision to abstain in the vote on UNSCR 1973 and not to participate in the NATO-led Operation Odyssey Dawn. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, for instance, used the Arab League's criticism in March 2011 to justify his country’s position: “We decided not to participate with German soldiers, we calculated the

---

<sup>21</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201106100249.html> (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.agi.it/english-version/world/elenco-notizie/201107012233-pol-ren1114-african-union-will-not-act-on-gaddafi-arrest-warrant> (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press\\_corner/all\\_news/news/2011/20110317\\_01\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110317_01_en.htm) (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>24</sup> <http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE7296UT20110310?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews> (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>25</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119809.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119809.pdf) (accessed 31 October 2011)

risk and if we see that three days after this intervention began the Arab League already criticized this intervention, I think we had good reasons.”<sup>26</sup> In a critical response, his Spanish counterpart, Trinidad Jiménez, argued that military operations were conducted in “strict respect” of the UN framework: “because in the resolution it says no-fly zone and all measures for protecting the civilian population, so all measures also means to act in this way, military speaking.”<sup>27</sup>

## **Conclusion**

By drawing on a series of past and current crisis management operations, this comparative analysis has shown that there is a good degree of alignment between the EU and the UN. Most EU operations have been explicitly authorized by UNSC resolutions while the others have been designed within the general framework of existing UN operations. As enshrined in several joint declarations, the ‘choice of multilateralism’ has constantly driven EU-UN cooperation since 2003, when Operation Artemis in the DRC inaugurated this partnership also in the field of military crisis management, with significant logistical commitments and manpower by both parties. In most cases, military operations have been conducted through various forms of ‘institutionalized multilateralism’, that is, within a clear operational framework provided by the UN. Whether bridging or standby in nature, these military missions have been closely designed through senior level cooperation in New York and Brussels. Moreover, the analysis has shown that other forms of crisis management, especially focusing on diplomatic means and involving a variety of other actors, have been generally developed as forms of ‘crystallizing multilateralism’, as is the case of the Middle East Quartet in which the EU and the UN are two members of a broader group characterised by a certain degree of flexibility and shared norms, or ‘aspirant multilateralism’, as was the case with the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia in which negotiations were conducted within an ad-hoc platform involving key global players and regional organisations without specific procedural rules and norms.

At the same time, this paper has highlighted the fundamental distinction between EU-UN cooperation at the top level and the actual degree of coordination on the ground. Indeed, as most crisis management operations reveal, the existence of institutionalized forms of cooperation between New York and Brussels is no guarantee of effective multilateralism in the field. This is particularly the case in the context of military operations, as exemplified by

---

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article\\_1627577.php/Germany-opposition-exposes-EU-divisions-on-Libyan-military-action](http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1627577.php/Germany-opposition-exposes-EU-divisions-on-Libyan-military-action) (accessed 31 October 2011).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

the cases of the DRC and Kosovo. Simply assessing the effectiveness of EU-UN multilateral crisis management in terms of general cooperation at the political and diplomatic level may therefore yield misleading conclusions. In the end, what really matters for successful conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace making is what happens in the field, where tensions and rivalries can be extremely entrenched. In the case of civilian crisis management, the EU and the UN have been able to ensure better coordination when they have complemented each other, often focusing on different geographical areas. Such a type of complementarity has been achieved without particular forms of institutional cooperation, mostly relying on horizontal communication between the various actors in the field.

This apparent paradox can be explained by the fact that, in spite of the generic references to ‘multilateralism’, the EU is interested in setting its own agenda in the various cooperation initiatives developed with the UN. According to some, this “ambiguous” attitude results from two potentially contrasting aspirations:

1. on the one hand, the EU strives to support the UN and operate legitimately within its framework and mandate;
2. on the other hand, it wishes to carve out an autonomous space for its role in multilateral crisis management, be it through military means or through diplomatic strategies (Tardy 2005).

This complexity is further compounded by the fact that the EU is not a unitary actor in crisis management. Not only do various institutions within the Union’s architecture have different prerogatives, but also Member States often have their own individual agendas. Of course, diversity can have added value in multilateralism as it allows for meaningful dialogue with a wide range of interlocutors. In this regard, the EU has a strong track record in terms of outreach and cooperation with other regional actors, from the Arab League to the AU. At the same time, however, competing interests and perspectives among Member States have undoubtedly weakened the EU’s overall impact, from the Balkans to Africa, Asia and the Middle East. As such, operating strictly under UN jurisdiction (and leadership) may become an easy way for the EU to shed direct responsibilities and achieve a minimum common denominator among its leading Member States.

## Bibliography

- Boshoff, H. (2005) 'The African Union Mission in Sudan: Technical and Operational Dimensions', *African Security Review*, 14 (3): 57-60.
- Bouchard, C. and Peterson, J. (2011) *Conceptualising Multilateralism: Can We All Just Get Along?*, Mercury E-Paper 1, January 2011, [http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user\\_upload/E\\_paper\\_no\\_1\\_Revised\\_Version.pdf](http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E_paper_no_1_Revised_Version.pdf) (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Commission of the European Union (2003) *The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism*, COM/2003/0526 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003DC0526:EN:HTML> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Council of the European Union (2004) *EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration* <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UN%20co-operation%20in%20Military%20Crisis%20Management%20Operations.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Council of the European Union (2007) *Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UNstatmntoncrsmngmnt.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- EU (2003) *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- EU (2009) *Joint Declarations of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May, 2009*. Brussels. 7 May. 8435/09 (Presse 78).
- EU and UN (2003) *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management*, Brussels and New York, [http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article\\_2768\\_en.htm](http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_2768_en.htm) (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Gowan, R. (2009) 'ESDP and the United Nations', in G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (eds), *European Security and Defence Policy: The first ten years*. Paris: European Institute for Security Studies.
- Hafner-Burton, E.M. (2008) 'Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the human rights enforcement problem', *International Organization*, 62: 689-716.
- Haine, J. Y. and Giegerich, B. (2006) 'In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/12/opinion/12iht-edhaine.1954062.html> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- International Crisis Group (2008) *Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion, Europe Report no. 206, 26 August 2010*. Brussels: International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo.aspx> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Lurweg, M. (2011) 'Coherent Actor or Institution Wrangler? The European Union as a Development and Security Actor in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo', *African Security Review*, 4 (2): 100-126
- Major, C. (2008) 'EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006', *The European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper n: 72*, <http://ftp.infoeuropa.eu/ocid.pt/database/000042001-000043000/000042438.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Morsut, C. (2009) 'Effective Multilateralism? EU-UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003-2006', *International Peacekeeping*, 16 (2): 261-272.
- Peterson, J., Aspinwall, M., Damro, C. and Boswell, C. (2008) *The Consequences of Europe: Multilateralism and the New Security Agenda*, Europa Institute Mitchell



- Working Paper, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh- Europa Institute, 3/08, <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/mitchellworkingpapers/papers.aspx> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Pinfari, M. (2011), Human Security in a Troubled Neighbourhood: The EU and the 2006 Lebanon War, EU GRASP Case Study, forthcoming.
- Pirozzi, N. (2006) 'UN peacekeeping in Lebanon: Europe's Contribution', *European Security Review* 30: 1-3.
- Prendergast, K. (2006) 'Interview with Sir Kieran Prendergast, Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs', *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 30 ( 1), <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/30-1pdfs/prendergast.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Scheuermann, M. (2010) 'The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo', *EU-GRASP Working Paper N 14*, [http://www.eugrasp.eu/uploads/media/WP14\\_final.pdf](http://www.eugrasp.eu/uploads/media/WP14_final.pdf) (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Solana, J. (2005) Speech by the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, 26 September 2005. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/speech05-10.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Sperling, J. and Webber, M. (2009) 'NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul', *International Affairs*, 85 (3): 491-511.
- Tardy, T. (2005) 'EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: a promising relationship in a constrained environment', in M. Ortega (ed.) *The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in Effective Multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper No. 78, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/cc78-Text.pdf> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- United Nations Security Council (2007) Report of the Security Council mission on the Kosovo issue, 4 May 2007, S/2007/256, New York: United Nations, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2007/256&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC> (accessed 31 October 2011).
- Whitman, R. G. and Wolff, S. (2010) 'The EU as a conflict manager: The case of Georgia and its implications', *International Affairs*, 86: 1-21.
- Yorke, V. (1999) *The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process*, London: Saferwood.